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Notes
THE ROLE OF SCIENTER AND THE NEED TO
LIMIT DAMAGES IN RULE 10b-5 ACTIONS-
THE TEXAS GULF SULPHUR LITIGATION
One of the most complex and baffling areas of securities law is
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and controversial
Rule 10b-5 2 promulgated under it. This statute and rule deal with
fraudulent and misleading practices in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities. Since the Rule has been frequently used in cases
involving small, closely held corporations, it is important that lawyers
with corporate clients have some knowledge of 10b-5 jurisprudence.
A primary reason for the confusion surrounding 10b-5 litigation
is that three distinct types of plaintiffs-the Securities and Exchange
Commission [hereinafter SEC], private parties, and the corporation-
are allowed to bring an action under the Rule. Although each type
of plaintiff must frame his action within the same 10b-5 language,
each has a unique reason for seeking relief. The SEC is concerned
with protecting the public from violations of the securities laws and
its primary remedy is an injunction. In contrast, the private party
usually seeks monetary damages as compensation for the loss he
suffered from the defendant's deception.
When one of the defendants is a public issue corporation, an
additional consideration arises. Because of the many daily transac-
tions in the stock of such a company, a corporation could become
liable for a monstrous judgment if its conduct fell within the Rule's
prohibition. Payment of the judgment would come from the assets
of the company which means that the innocent stockholder would
be ultimately the source of recovery. One case, which will be dis-
cussed at length subsequently, used a theory of liability which could
result in damages of over 30 million dollars against the particular
corporation if all potential plaintiffs were to bring suit. Due to this
possibility of extensive liability, the development of a limiting doctrine
seems necessary.
When the plaintiff is a corporation the same problem of unlimited
liability exists if a public issue corporation is one of the defendants.
Frequently, however, the corporate action takes the form of a minority
148 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. 78i(b) (1964).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). ~Hereinafter cited as the Rule.]
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stockholder's derivative suit against the controlling interests of the
company. When this occurs the danger arises that the complaint will
essentially consist of allegations of bad business judgment and
corporate waste against the insiders. Although Congress may have
intended Section 10b to encompass a broad remedy, it is doubtful that
it intended the federal courts to concern themselves with the business
decisions of corporations. Since these cases do not seem to fall within
the purpose of the Rule, a need arises to distinguish them from the
other 10b-5 cases.
Because of the differences between each type of plaintiff, it is
necessary to analyze 10b-5 cases with regard to which party is bringing
the action. This article will examine the requirement of scienter3 as
it affects each plaintiff in his efforts to prevail under the Rule. The
need to limit damages in the private action will be discussed and
the offered solution will be to require scienter and establish an
alternative remedy of restitution in situations where the defendant
has made a wrongful profit without deceitful intent. Due to the com-
plex nature of the subject matter this note will begin by tracing the
development of 10b-5 jurisprudence and then examine the rule of
scienter in relation to each of the different types of plaintiffs.
I. 10b-5 JUisPRUDENCE BEcomEs PERPLEXIG
The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression which
followed served as a catalyst in the realignment of many economic
facets of American life. One of the significant changes was the estab-
lishment of federal regulation in the securities industry. During the
depths of the depression people were shaken by the disclosure that a
few insiders in some of America's most respected corporations had
escaped financial ruin through transactions based on knowledge not
available to the general public.4 As a result of these disclosures, Con-
gress passed the Securities Act of 19335 and the Securities Exchange
3 BLACK'S LAW DicrioNARY 1512 (4th ed. 1968) defies scienter as "the de-
fendant's previous knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained of,
or rather his previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard
against, and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained of." Thus
scienter is a broad term which connotes a knowing awareness of the wrongful
activity. Frequently courts discuss the scienter issue in terms of whether proof of
fraud is required. However, fraud, in its tort sense, requires proof of an intentional
misrepresentation. See W. PnossEl, TnE LAW OF ToRTs § 100 (3d ed. 1964).
Since scienter includes intentional nondisclosures its scope is considerably broader
than a mere intent to defraud.
4J. GALBBArr, THE GREAT CRASH 170-171(1955); W. PAIN R, FEDErAL
REcULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 1-2(1968).
5 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
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Act of 1934.6 Briefly, this legislation was designed to protect the
investor, maintain integrity and honesty in the securities market, and
curb "unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation."7 One of the
practices prohibited by this legislation was the use of manipulative
and deceptive devices in regard to security transactions. This pro-
hibition was articulated by Section 10b of the 19348 Act as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Eight years later the Securities and Exchange Commission exercised
its rule making power9 and established the now famous Rule 10b-510
-which provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
For the first several years after the Rule was promulgated, few
significant issues were raised under it. This peaceful situation was
not to last, however, and soon the federal courts were asked such
difficult questions as whether the Rule created a private right of
action, whether a corporation could sue under the Rule, whether
scienter was necessary to establish liability, and many other questions
of a similarly complicated nature. When courts turned to the Rule
to decide these issues, they discovered its general language provided
6 48 Stat. 881 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964).
7 Note, Negligent Misrepresentations under Rule 10b-5, 82 U. Cm. L. Ev.
824, 829 (1965).
848 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
9 PAn-rrER, supra note 4, at 19.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1970).
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little direction as to its specific requirements. Moreover, the legislative
history of Section 10b proved so incomplete that a determination of
congressional intent became a matter of conjecture." Due to this lack
of guidance, the judiciary was forced to rely on its own sense of
justice and fairness to determine the outcome of each case. As a
result, 10b-5 jurisprudence has grown on a case by case basis in the
same tradition as the common law.
Generally, the courts have assigned an expansive, liberal con-
struction to the Rule.' 2 This trend was begun when it was decided
that private parties had a right of action; 13 later the Rule was further
enlarged to include corporations within its protection.14 These de-
cisions, along with the Securities and Exchange Commission's statutory
right to sue,15 created a situation whereby three distinct types of
plaintiffs could frame their suit under 10b-5. Because of the different
motivation of each party and the need to limit actions by private and
corporate litigants, the courts should have developed distinct legal
principles for each action. Unfortunately this has not occurred due
to several factors. The most obvious reason is that all three parties
were bringing their actions under the same statute and rule. Once
a court had decided a particular issue there was a natural tendency to
carry over this interpretation into other areas of 10b-5 jurisprudence.
Moreover, since the law developed on a case by case basis, the courts
were never presented with an overview of the whole field of 10b-5
litigation. Compounding the judiciary's problems was the fact that
the Supreme Court has considered only one 10b-5 case, which merely
discussed a single minor point of law.16 Due to the Supreme Court's
"1 Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C. L.
Rzv. 482, 496 (1970).
' 2 Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10b-5?, 24 Bus. LAw. 69, 73, 74
(1968). Prof. Marsh cites three factors which he believes caused the courts to
interpret 10b-5 broadly:
(1) An increase in federalization and centralization
9) Greater judicial activism
The unwillingness or inability of states to enact fair and balanced
laws protecting persons involved in securities transactions.
13 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Penn. 1947).
14 Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
'.5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21e, 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).
16 SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). In this case the
Commission sought relief for violation of 10b-5 in connection with a merger of
Producers Life Insurance Co. into a subsidiary of National Securities, Inc. Share-
holder approval of the merger was obtained through proxy material containing
alleged misrepresentations and omissions.
The defendants argued that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which forbids
federal intervention into state regulation of the insurance field, barred the Com-
mission's suit. Furthermore, the defendants contended that solicitation of proxies
(Continued on next page)
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lack of leadership 7 the lower federal courts have been forced to try
to anticipate the highest court's position by analogizing 10b-5 actions
to other federal securities provisions which the Supreme Court has
construed.
Besides failing to develop a comprehensive system of specific
legal principles, the courts were sometimes unable to fully develop
the narrow issues which were presented by the cases. One reason for
,-this was the fact that so many 10b-5 cases arose on motions to dismiss
'for failure to state a claim. The courts usually interpreted these
complaints liberally since the sole issue was whether the plaintiff
would be allowed to bring his action. Upon sustaining the claim, the
case was usually settled out of court and the judiciary was thereby
denied the opportunity to pass on the end results. If the courts had
had the benefit of seeing the effects of their holdings, 10b-5 juris-
prudence would probably be much clearer today. Additionally, in
the field of private litigation under the Rule, many of the cases
involved private, closely-held corporations which therefore eliminated
the limiting consideration of the innocent shareholder of the public
issue corporation.
Finally, the courts have tended to avoid establishing strict criteria
to allow themselves much greater flexibility in reaching their de-
cisions. The history of the buyer-seller requirement illustrates this
point. Originally it was required that a private party be a buyer or
seller of securities before he could bring an action under the Rule,'8
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
did not constitute a "purchase or sale" of securities and therefore § 10b and the
Rule were mapplicable.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Marshall held that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act did not bar the Commission's suit and that the proxy solicitation fell within
the bounds of the Rule. In reaching this latter conclusion Marshall reasoned that
if the scheme had worked the shareholders of Producers would have lost their
shareholder status in that company in exchange for a similar status in the new
company. Therefore, the effect of a successful merger would be a "purchase" by
,,former Producers shareholders of stock in the new company.
On this point Harlan dissented, arguing that only the issue of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was properly before the court. He contended that since any decision
by the Supreme Court construing the Rule would be of great importance, the
10b-5 issue should be avoided until all sides of the question could be fully argued.
For the Supreme Court's first foray into the morass of 10b-5 litigation, this
decision was disappointing. The opinion merely added another exception to the
buyer-seller requirement without analyzing in depth the underlying theory behind
this requirement. Justice Harlan was correct in approaching 10b-5 with caution,
but if the court is too cautious it may never be able to assert the leadership
necessary to alleviate the confusion surrounding the Rule.
17 Marsh, supra note 12, at 74. The author claims that the Supreme Court is
the most logical candidate to restore order and predictability to 10b-5 cases. He
concludes however, that the Court has neither the inclination nor the ability to
perform such a task.
18 Birnbaum v. Newport Steep Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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but subsequent decisions riddled this requirement with exceptions.19
Because of the broad effect courts have been willing to give 10b-5,
they have drawn fire from numerous persons.20 One unidentified
writer summed up his feelings in an Ode to 10b.5 which reads as
follows:
Can any man a prophet be
When dealing with the SEC?
Officer, lawyer, director beware
10b-5 is everywhere.
Even though the facts seem small,
You must disclose, you must tell all,
Now that you've done your very best,
A market bust may cause arrest.
Cause and effect don't seem to be
Important to all, but they ought to be.
There's no need to rely or even read,
The material test is all they need.
The state of the law is clear as can be,
Don't sell or buy a security.
Don't offer to merge or utter a word,
Unless you're prepared for liability transferred.
You may own a yacht, a house by the sea,
But you'll not have them long if you clash with 10b.
21
It would be a hopeless task for one note to effectively cover all
the issues which have arisen under the Rule. Therefore, such im-
portant issues as the buyer-seller requirement,
22 definitions of insider,23
*19 SEC v. National Securities Inc., 398 U.S. 453 (1969); Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (not necessary to be a buyer or seller
in suits for injunctions); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (short form merger qualified as a sale
since the stockholder was forced to turn in his shares or receive nothing); Com-
merce Reporting Co. v. Puretec Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (an
abortive purchaser was considered a "purchaser" for the purpose of the Rule).
20 Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 Bunr. L. REv.
205 (1970); Marsh, supra note 12, Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second
Round: Privity and State of Mind in 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Case, 63 Nw. U. L.
REv. 423 (1968).
2
1 TEE INSTrru OF COuNruswG LEGAL EDUCATION, EMERGING FEDERAL
SEcunrnEs LAW: PoTENTAL& Lr_,mnr= 226 (1969).
22 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); See also cases cited at note 19 supra; Note, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 684 (1968).
23 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); Matter
of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 912 (1961) (An insider was defined as
one who has "access directly or indirectly to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.").
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and materiality,24 requirements of privity25 and reliance26 and liability
for nondiselosure27 will not be discussed at length. As previously
mentioned, the main focus of this article will be the role of scienter
in 10b-5 cases and damages against a public issue corporation.
I. AcrioN BY TME SEC
A. Injunction
As indicated in the introduction, the SEC could seek an injunction
under Section 21(e) of the 1934 Act when it appeared that "any
person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices, which
constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this
chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder."2 This remedy is
widely utilized by the Commission as indicated by the fact that it
had obtained 1,614 injunctions against 5,022 defendants as of June
30, 1969.29 Because SEC injunctions are creatures of statutes, all
that had to be established is what the statute required, without
reference to proof of irreparable injury or the inadequacy of other
remedies as in the usual suit for injunctions.30
Besides lessening the requirements for an injunction by statute,
the courts further extended its application by discarding scienter as
a necessary element. This elimination was established by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureaus1 where it interpreted
the Investment Advisor's Act of 194032 which was analogous to SEC
actions under the Rule. In that case, Mr. Justice Goldberg dis-
24 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The
basic test of materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach importance in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.").
25 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (Rule
pertains to transactions conducted on the stock exchanges); Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunne 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (privity not required); Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1958) (privity
required).
26 List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965) (must rely on material nondisclosure to recover damages); But see
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (court held that it was not
necessary to show a vote of shareholders was caused by misleading statements-
may be applicable to 10b-5 by analogy).
27 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968),
(liability for nondisclosure); List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), (liability for nondisclosure if it was
material and was relied upon); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808
(D. Del. 1951) (liability for nondisclosure).
2848 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).
29 35 SEC ANN. REP. 197 (1969).
30 L. Loss, SEcu=nrims REGuLATION 1979 (Temp. Stud. Ed. 1961).
31375 U.S. 180 (1963).
32 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 8b-1 et seq. (1964).
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tinguished sharply between damage proceedings and injunctions by
saying:
It is true that at common law intent and injury have been
deemed essential elements in a damage suit between parties to an
arm's-length transaction. But this is not such an action. This is
a suit for a preliminary injunction in which the relief sought is, as
the dissenting judges below characterized it, the "mild prophy-
lactic," requiring a fiduciary to disclose to his clients, not all his
security holdings, but only his dealings in recommended securities
just before and after the issuance of his recommendations.
The content of common law fraud has not remained static as
the courts below seem to have assumed. It has varied, for example,
with the nature of the relief sought, the relationship between the
parties, and the merchandise in issue. It is not necessary in a suit
for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements
required in a suit for monetary damages.3 3
This elimination of the scienter requirement was followed by the
Second Circuit in the now famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case.3 4 In that
case the SEC brought an action for an injunction and damages against
Texas Gulf Sulphur and nine insiders. Since the damages were sought
under the Commission's auxiliary power, which will be examined
subsequently, only the factual setting relating to the injunction will
be discussed here. Texas Gulf Sulphur had made extensive copper
and zinc discoveries in Northern Canada and rumors of this large
strike had begun to circulate throughout Canada and the United
States which caused a rise in the company's stock prices.35 On April
12, 1964, Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a press release playing down
the recent discoveries which caused stock prices to drop.36 Four days
later the company announced the discovery of at least 25 million tons
of ore.37 The SEC subsequently brought an action to enjoin the
defendants from issuing further misleading statements. The trial court
found that the issuing of the April 12th press release was not in
violation of the Rule because it was not issued for the purpose of
benefiting the corporation, there was no evidence that any insider
used the release to his personal advantage and it was not "misleading
or deceptive" on the basis of the facts then known.38 The Second
Circuit reversed the lower court's findings saying that the proper test
was whether the release was misleading because of the company's
38 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 192, 193 (1063).
84 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
35 Id. at 843-45.
86 Id. at 845-46.
37 Id. at 846.
38 SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 292-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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lack of due diligence.3 9 As to whether proof of scienter was necessary,
Judge Waterman, who wrote the majority opinion, seemed to feel
that neither SEC actions nor private actions required such proof.
[W]hether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC en-
forcement proceeding or as a private action, proof of a specific
intent to defraud is unnecessary.
40
However, Judge Friendly, who concurred in the result, pointed
out his concern over finding damages against a corporation for a
negligent misrepresentation.
The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting
of a press release such as that of April 12, 1964, may impose civil
liability on the corporation are frightening. As has been well said,
of a situation where time pressures and consequent risks were less,
"One source of perplexity as to the appropriate bounds of the civil
remedy for misleading filings is that any remedy imposed against
the issuer itself is indirectly imposed on all holders of the common
stock, usually the most important segment of the total category
of investors intended to be protected."41
On remand, Judge Bonsal of the Southern District of New York
determined that the press release was misleading,42 and that there
was a lack of due diligence on the part of Texas Gulf Sulphur in
drafting it.43 He decided that an injunction against the company was
unnecessary, however, because of the "once in a lifetime" nature of
the circumstances. 44 Of the seven individual defendants, Judge Bonsai
found that four of them had violated the Rule only because the test
of materiality had been expanded (they had purchased shares before
the April 12th press release) and another was no longer associated
with the company.45 For these reasons an injunction was denied
against these defendants. As to the two defendants who had pur:
chased stock just before the April 16th announcement, he found that
their action was wrongful even under the previous case law,40 and
therefore enjoined them.
47
From the foregoing, it seems clear that courts will not entertain
the defense of lack of scienter in SEC enforcement proceedings. The
fairness of this result is verified when the interests of the SEC and
39 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968).
40 Id. at 854 (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 866-67 (citations omitted).42 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
43 Id. at 86.
44 Id. at 88.
45 Id. at 90.
46 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
47 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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defendant are analyzed. Since an injunction will lie only if a de-
fendant has already violated the Rule or a violation is imminent, the
injunction serves as an excellent method to put the defendant on
notice of the seriousness of his actions. To require the Commission
to prove scienter would seem to unduly burden the SEC in its efforts
to enforce the securities laws.
B. Ancillary Relief
Although the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorized the SEC
to seek injunctive relief to enforce the securities laws, nowhere was
the Commission empowered to obtain money damages.48 The courts,
however, have held that when an injunction has been sought under
Section 21e, they may use their inherent power to grant all the
equitable relief necessary under the circumstances. 49 The judiciary
predicted its power to grant such relief on Section 27 of the Act50
which states:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
Until recently the precedent for granting the Commission money
damages stemmed from two sources. The first source was a few cases
in which the courts, under their ancilliary powers, granted the SEC's
request for appointment of a receiver.5 ' The other source was based
on instances where courts had granted similar relief to other federal
agencies under analogous statutes.52 Since neither of these authorities
were directly in point, it was not until Texas Gulf Sulphur that the
right of the SEC to seek damages was clearly established. There,
in addition to injunctive relief, the Commission asked for rescission
and restitution with the recovery to the sellers who actually sold their
shares to the individual defendants. 53 The trial court found that,
although the drilling was commenced on November 8, 1963, the drill-
ing results were not "material" until April 9, 1964.54 For this reason,
48 Comment, 65 MICH. L. Rlv. 944, 945-46 (1967).
49 Id. at 946.
50 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(1964).
5' Comment, supra note 48, at 946.
52 Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Note, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 656, 658-60
(1966).
53 H. SowAm, CommENTs, CAsEs Am MATrERL&s ON SEctRrrms REGuL.ToN
407 (1966).
54 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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those insiders who made their purchases before that date were not
liable. Of the nine individual defendants only two were found to be
in violation of the Rule because they had purchased their shares
immediately before the April 16th announcement which had dis-
closed the extent of the ore strike55 On appeal, the Second Circuit
chose to adopt a more liberal "reasonable investor" test for materiality5 6
and found liability as to those insiders who purchased their shares
after the preliminary drilling results indicated a substantial strike.
5 7
The court did not distinguish the injunction portion of the suit from
the damages portion in holding that scienter was not required for
either. This elimination of the scienter requirement for damages was
reasonable because the damages which were sought were wrongful
profits derived from insider trading. Since the defendants' dealings
were illegal, it should not have been necessary to prove an evil intent
before they were ordered to give up their profits.
On remand to determine the proper remedies, the SEC abandoned
its first approach which asked for rescission and restitution for the
benfit of those sellers who actually sold their shares to insiders.
Undoubtedly, two considerations influenced the SEC in changing its
approach. The first was the difficulty in tracing the stock purchases,58
and second, was the initiation of numerous private suits59 which in-
dicated that the private investor who sold to an insider did not need
the Commission to protect his rights. As an alternative to its original
approach, the SEC asked that the defendants be required to disgorge
any profits they bad made from the wrongful trading in Texas Gulf
Sulphur securities. Judge Bonsal granted the Commission's request
and adopted its formula for assessing damages which was as follows:
In applying the formula, the SEC proposes that the amount to
be paid by each defendant would be the difference between the
mean average price of TOS common stock on the New York Stock
Exchange on April 17, 1964, which has been stipulated by the
parties to be 40%, and the purchase price of their shares, and in
the case of calls, the aggregate of the purchase price and the cost
of exercise, with interest from April 17, 1964, at the New York
legal rate.
The payment would be made to TGS to be held in escrow in
an interest-bearing account for a period of three or more years,
subject to disposition in such manner as the court might direct
upon application by the SEC or other interested person or on the
55 Id. at 296.
56 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 838, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
57 Id. at 847-57.58 Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus.
LAw. 43, 56 (1968).
59 Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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court's own motion. At the end of the period any money remaining
undisposed of would become the property of TGS.
60
The reason for making the damages payment to Texas Gulf
Sulphur to be held in escrow was undoubtedly to help the company
pay off the numerous claims by private parties which had been filed.
Because of the extensive use of the private action by investors, it
remains to be seen how frequently the SEC will invoke the court's
ancillary powers and request damages. Certainly today the investor
needs little help from the SEC in enforcing his rights under Rule
10b-5. Perhaps if the Commission had anticipated the landslide of
private litigation in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, it would have fore-
gone its request for damages. If, however, the courts adopt the theory
which is urged in this article and limit plaintiffs to either damages
which were intentionally caused, or to recovery of wrongful profits
from defendants who lacked the requisite scienter, then a damage
action by the SEC could become significant. Under this theory
there would be many cases where the damages which would be
recoverable by private parties could also be recovered by the SEC.
In these cases, allowing the Commission to seek damages could
enable all the claim to be consolidated into one action, which would
greatly simplify procedure since the multiplicity of suits arising under
the same circumstances would be eliminated.
In retrospect, the development of ancillary relief is still too recent
to make an accurate prediction as to its impact on 10b-5 jurisprudence.
However, as long as the private plaintiff is given an extensive remedy
under the Rule, a damage action by the SEC appears to have limited
utility.
III. PmRvATE ACION
Today the right of a private party to sue under the Rule is clearly
established. The first case to decide this issue was Kardon v. National
Gypsum Company6l and this result has been sustained by numerous
60 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6173 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Penn. 1947). In this case Judge Kirkpatrick found
that a private right of action existed under Rule 10b-5 for two reasons. First he
reasoned that since Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act declared that any
contract in violation of any provision of the Act shall be void, it necessarily followed
that a remedy must be implied along with it. Without this implied remedy the
statute would be of little consequence since a party could not relieve himself of
obligations under it or escape its consequences.
The second theory advanced by Judge Kirkpatrick, the so-called "statutory
tort theory" was undoubtedly the more significant of the two theories in the
development of 10b-5 jurisprudence. He reasoned that § 10b and the Rule created
a duty to behave within the expressed standard of conduct. Therefore it followed
that an individual who disregarded the command of the statute committed a tort.
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lower federal courts. In addition, the Supreme Court in 1. I. Case
Company v. Borak62 held that Section 14a of the 1934 Act concerning
misleading proxy solicitations created a private remedy and by analogy
this holding can be applied to 10b-5 actions.
With the decision that 10b-5 created a private right, it was
inevitable that the courts would have to decide what role scienter
would play in these cases. For the purpose of this discussion, those
decisions which have indicated that scienter is required will be
analyzed separately from those that have not.
A. Decisions Requiring Scienter
The first case to consider the role of scienter in a private action
under the Rule was Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Company.
6 3
In that case the common stockholders brought an action under 10b-5
alleging that they were persuaded to buy stock in the defendant
corporation by misstatements and omissions in a prospectus covering
only preferred stock. The district court dismissed their claim, reason-
ing that since their action was based on allegedly false statements in
a prospectus, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 constituted their
exclusive remedy. Since relief under that Section was limited to
buyers purchasing the stock issue covered by the prospectus, the
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. 4
The Second Circuit reversed and stated:
•.. when, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there
is added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes action-
able under § 10b of the 1934 Act and the Rule .... 65
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on what it meant by
"ingredient of fraud."
The rationale of Fischman was followed by a New York federal
district court in Weber v. C.M.P. Corporation,66 and the test was
articulated as "knowledge of the falsity of the alleged untrue state-
62 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In this case the Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of whether § 14(a) and the Rule 14a-9 concerning misleading proxy solicita-
tions created a private remedy. The court disregarded the statutory tort theory and
instead based its opinion allowing the private suit on the broad remedial purpose
of the Rule. Thus when the Supreme Court finally decides whether 10b-5 creates
a private remedy, it may sustain the action by relying on the broad remedial
purpose of the Rule rather than the statutory tort theory.
63 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
4 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
05 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951)
(emphasis added).
66 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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ment."67 Outside of several New York district court decisions which
followed Fischman,6 only one court outside the Second Circuit has
taken a similar position. In Trussell v. Underwriters,69 the federal
district court of Colorado held that two of the plaintiffs' claims were
insufficient since they did not allege that the misstatements were
made "knowingly or intentionally."70 It added, however, that a repre-
sentation made with reckless disregard of truth or falsity would
satisfy this requirement.71 A year later this same court reaffirmed
its position in Parker v. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corporation,7"
despite a seemingly binding opinion by the Tenth Circuit73 indicating
that proof of common law fraud was unnecessary under Section 10b
and the Rule. The court merely avoided the higher court's precedent
by characterizing that portion of the decision which eliminated
scienter as dictum.74
B. Decisions Eliminating Scienter
The first significant case to hold that scienter was not required by
Rule 10b-5 was Ellis v. Carter.75 In that case a plaintiff-buyer sought
to recover damages caused by allegedly fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions.76 The defendants resisted the action by arguing that 10b-5
offered no right of recovery to defrauded buyers. The court rejected
this defense and stated that a showing of common law fraud was
not essential to establish a cause of action under the Rule. In eliminat-
ing scienter as a requirement, the court used language which implied
that proof of a "mere misstatement or omission" was all that was
necessary to establish liability.77 Under this interpretation even in-
nocent, nonegligent misstatements or omissions would be actionable
under the Rule.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Ellis approach in Stevens v.
67 id. at 323.
68 Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Richland v. Crandall,
262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
69 228 F. Supp. 757 (D.Colo. 1964).
70 Id. at 773.
71Id. at 772.
72 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965).
7 3 Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
74 Parker v. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267, 270 (D.
Colo. 1965).
75 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
76 In this case the plaintiff claimed that the defendants sold him 10,000
shares of Republic Picture Corporation by fraudulently representing that the stock
carried with it a voice in the management. Upon buying in, the plaintiff was
excluded from any say in the management of the company.77 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
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Vowell, 78 a case in which the defendants' behavior was particularly
outrageous.79 In this case the court eliminated the requirement of
scienter by saying:
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make
out a case under the statute and rule. It is only necessary to prove
one of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of
fact or the omission to state a material fact.8 0
Since this language fails to distinguish between material misstatements
and omissions which are negligently made and those which are made
innocently, it could be argued that under the Stevens approach de-
fendants are held to a strict liability. The value of this case as
precedent, however, is dubious since in Parker a district court circum-
vented this portion of the opinion by characterizing it as dictum.
Although the Seventh and Eighth Circuits looked upon Ellis with
favor in dicta,"' the only case in which the decision can be said to
have been based directly on Ellis is Hendricks v. Flato Realty Invest-
ments.82 In that case the district judge relied on Ellis to reject a
motion to dismiss for failure to allege scienter and simply stated that
he felt it was the most "logical approach"
8 3
The more recent cases have been careful to exclude innocent mis-
representation or omission from 10b-5 protection. In Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Company,8 the plaintiff alleged that he had purchased
securities in reliance on false figures in Thor's financial statements.
The district judge discussed Ellis and stated that under that case
"even due care is no defense to an action under Rule lOb-5."85 Had
the court followed this approach the plaintiff could have recovered
by only proving that the statements were material and false. The
court, however, rejected strict liability and held that only intentional
or negligent misrepresentations were in the ambit of the Rule.86
The Eighth Circuit, which had previously looked upon Ellis favor-
ably,87 altered its approach somewhat in City National Bank v. Vander-
78 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
70 In this case the defendants represented to the plaintiff that the entire
amount of his investment would be used for the construction of Arro-Triever
archery lanes in Utah. In reality, the defendants had no connection with the
actual owner of Arro-Triever and no such lanes were ever built.
80 Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965).
81Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
82 CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. ff 92,290 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
83 Id. at 11 97,388.
84282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. IM. 1967).
85 Id. at 101.
80 Id. at 105.
8 7 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
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boom.s8 In this case the court rejected strict liability and held that
a defendant would not be liable under the Rule unless his "mis-
representation or nondisclosure was made with scienter or from a
lack of due diligence."8 9
Although some cases have articulated the test in terms of strict
liability, for misrepresentation or omissions, no faultless defendant
has ever been held to have violated 10b-5. In both E/!is and Stevens
the courts were faced with intentional misrepresentations9" and re-
covery could have been sustained in an interpretation requiring
scienter. It appears that in cases eliminating scienter as a require-
ment, the more reprehensible the conduct of the defendant is, the
broader the reading of 10b-5 will be. When the courts have to
squarely face the issue of whether innocent defendants can be held
liable, they will probably follow the example of the district judge in
Drake and require that at least negligence be proved.
C. Damages Against a Corporate Defendant
The cases which have just been discussed indicate the conflicting
and confusing positions of courts on the role of scienter in private
actions under the Rule. However, in actions to assess damages against
a public issue corporation these cases may be dubious precedents.
All but two of the cases which have just been examined arose on
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.91 Because of this, the
courts did not have to consider the extent of potential liability. In
the future, courts may be more hesitant to speak on matters which
they have not fully considered. In Heit v. WeitzenM2 the Second
Circuit was asked to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it failed
to allege scienter. The court wisely avoided the issue by saying:
There is no occasion for us to enter this thicket now as we
pass only upon the legal sufficiency of the complaints to allege a
88 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970).
891d. at 280.
90 See the fact pattern of each case, supra notes 76 & 79.91 In Stevens v. Vowell, 348 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965), the plaintiff had
received a judgment and in City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221
(8th Cir. 1970), the 10b-5 issue was raised on an unsuccessful counterclaim.
92402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). In this case the plaintiffs allegedly pur-
chased securities in reliance on the corporation's annual report and press releases
which failed to disclose that a substantial amount of its income for the fiscal year
1964 was derived from various overcharges on government contracts. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the fraudulent scheme was
aimed at the government and not purchasers of stock. Because of this the trial
judge felt the complaint did not satisfy the "in connection with the purchase or
.sale of any securities" requrLement of 10b-5. The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that it was foreseeale tat investors would rely on the false information and that
"ulterior motive" was irrelevant.
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claim for relief. This each of the complaints fairly does. The
charge that defendants knew or should have known adequately
alleges actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements, and
alternatively, negligence or lack of diligence in failing to ascertain
the true facts.93
Because courts have not had the opportunity to consider the role
of scienter simultaneously with the issue of damages, the outcome
of this situation remains an open question. Ultimately it is likely
that this issue will be settled by the private litigation surrounding
the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. The major private suit arising from
this case is presently pending in the Southern District Court of New
York. In that case, a class action was brought against Texas Gulf
Sulphur representing all the investors who had been damaged by
the company's nondisclosure and misleading press release. Although
a final decision has not been reached, Judge Bonsal has issued a
preliminary ruling in which he granted a summary judgment in favor
of TGS against all plaintiffs who sold their stock before March 27,
1964.94 He based his decision on the fact that before March 27th
the company was on a land acquisition program and therefore news
of the discovery had to remain secret.
Although the bulk of the litigation surrounding Texas Gulf Sulphur
has occurred in the Second Circuit, one district court outside that
circuit has rendered a decision in a private action against the corpora-
tion. In Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur9 5 four plaintiffs brought an
action in the Utah federal district court alleging that they had sold
their TGS stock because of the defendant's nondisclosure and mis-
leading April 12th press release. The plaintiffs sold their stock on
the following dates: Karlson-Dec. 11, 1963, Reynolds-April 21, 1964,
Stout-April 21, 1964, and Mitchell-April 17, 1964 and April 23, 1964.
On April 16, 1964 the company fully disclosed the large extent of the
strike. The district judge dismissed the claim of the plaintiff who
sold on Dec. 11, 1963 since the company was on a land acquisition
program which would have been thwarted by a disclosure of the
strike.90 Thus, on this point, the decision agreed with Judge Bonsars
preliminary ruling that business considerations justified the initial
nondisclosure of the discovery.
As to the other three complainants, however, it was a different
story. Each plaintiff testified that he had been induced to sell his
93 Id. at 914.94 Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 806 F. Supp. 1333, 1388-39 (S.D.N.Y.
19695 309 F. Supp. 548 (D.Utah 1970).
96 Id. at 558-59.
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shares by a misleading press release of April 12th despite the fact that
most of the sales came after the April 16th announcement disclosing
the ore strike. The district judge held that the April 12th press
release was "misleading, intentionally deceptive, inaccurate and know-
ingly deficient in material facts pertaining to the results of the drill-
ing."97 Since the plaintiffs had relied on the release, he concluded,
the corporation was liable for damages.
In ascertaining the extent of damages the court developed a
unique formula. It began its determination by saying the plaintiffs
should receive the "fair value" of the property which they had trans-
ferred. Principles of restitution and conversion were cited to support
this proposition.98 The court found the "fair value" by taking the
average of all of the highest market prices on the 20 trading days
preceding the April 16th announcement. The average was $50.75.
To determine his damages, each plaintiff subtracted his selling price
from $50.75, (this ascertained his damage per share), and then multi-
plied by the number of shares he had sold. Between the three
claimants the damages totaled $21,702.25 plus interest from the date
the shares were sold.99
This case presented a different approach to the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case in several respects. For one, the district judge characterized the
April 12th press release as intentionally misleading which contrasted
with the implication of Judge Friendly that the deception stemmed
from negligence.100 Since the violation was declared intentional,
Reynolds did not decide whether negligence alone would satisfy the
requirements of the Rule. Another surprise was the finding of liability
for sales which were consummated several days after the company
had made a full disclosure. 1' 1 Thus under the Reynolds approach,
once a misrepresentation has been made, the accumulation of potential
damage actions does not necessarily cease upon correction of the
mistake.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Reynolds case, however,
is the position on damages. The use of the restitution and conversion
principles to establish the nature of damages appears to be clearly
inappropriate. The remedy of restitution is designed to prevent unjust
97 Id. at 562.
98 Id. at 564-65.
99 Id. at 565.
300 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968).
101 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
judge Bonsai adopted the SEC formula for damages hch set April 17th as the
date from which damages could be measured; Ruder, supra note 20, at 429. In his
article on potential damages under the Rule, which was written before Reynolds,
Prof. Ruder omitted even considering that liability might be extended beyond the
disclosure date.
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enrichment and the measure of recovery is not the plaintiffs damage
but the benefit secured or reaped by the defendant at the expense
of the plaintiff.10 2 Since TGS did not purchase the plaintiffs shares,
it received no benefit from the sale and should not be liable to them
under a theory of restitution. In conversion, the defendant must have
exercised dominion or control over the plaintiffs property so as to
require a "forced sale" to the defendants.10 3 Although the wrongdoer
is required to pay "fair value" for the converted property he does
retain possession of that property and thereby the harsh aspect of
the remedy is mitigated. In Reynolds, since Texas Gulf Sulphur had
never acquired the plaintiffs shares, compelling it to pay the fair
value of the stock would force the company to pay for something
it never possessed. Because the plaintif's shares did not number
among the corporation's assets the mitigating aspect of a true con-
version case is not present and the affect of the remedy is extremely
harsh. For these reasons, the underlying theories on which the
"fair value" formula was based seem to be inapplicable.
Undoubtedly the most amazing feature of the Reynolds opinion
was the extent of potential liability for which the corporation could
become responsible. To reiterate, the court held that investors who
relied on the April 12th press release and sold their shares for less
than its fair value ($50.75) could recover from the company the
difference between their selling price and its fair value. If the closing
price on the New York Stock Exchange is taken as an approximate
average for each trading day, then it is revealed that between April
12th through April 27th (11 trading days) the prices received for
TGS shares were substantially below the $50.75 fair value price. The
chart reproduced below demonstrates the monstrous liability which
would occur by applying the Reynolds formula to all potential plaintiffs
trading on the New York Stock Exchange.
0 4
On ten of the eleven trading days Texas Gulf Sulphur was among
the ten most actively traded stocks on the New York Stock Exchange. 05
By subtracting the average price from $50.75 the damages per share
are determined and when this figure is multiplied by the number of
shares traded it is found the company's potential liability is $30,978,554.
02W. Pnossma, THE LAw OF TORTS 644 (3d ed. 1964).
103 Id. at 83-84.
104 It must be kept in mind that these figures reflect only the transactions on
the New York Stock Exchange. Since undoubtedly numerous TGS securities were
traded on other exchanges liability will be even greater than the computed figure.
Moreover, interest charges have not been figured in this calculation although
interest was granted in Reynolds. The illustrated totals were compiled from the
Wall Street Journal.
10 5 See generally, Wall Street J., April 13-28, 1964.
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Liability
Damages per (Damages per share
Traded Share x
Date Close Shares (50.75-Close) Shares Traded)
April 13 30-4 126,500 $19.87 $2,513,555
April 14 3044 76,900 $20.50 $1,576,450
April 15 29-% 43,800 $21.37 $ 936,006
April 16 36-% 444,200 $14.37 $6,383,154
April 17 4044 499,200 $10.50 $5,241,600
April 20 42- 378,500 $ 8.50 $3,217,250
April 21 40-4s 220,100 $10.62 $2,337,462
April 22 45-. 326,500 $ 5.25 $1,714,125
April 23 42-% 569,600 $ 8.12 $4,625,152
April 24 44-31 245,800 $ 6.50 $1,557,700
April 27 47 233,600 $ 3.75 $ 876,000
$30,978,554
Had a liability of this extent been assessed in 1964, which is when
the cause of action arose, the judgment would have amounted to
approximately 23 percent of the total shareholder's equity.
°10 In ad-
dition to the huge potential liability to which the corporation was
subjected, the district court made it extremely easy for a plaintiff to
qualify as an investor who relied on the misleading information. In
Reynolds, one plaintiff could not even recall where he had heard
the misrepresentation.107 Therefore, in cases in which the misleading
nature of a corporate announcement is revealed to the public, numerous
buyers or sellers of its securities will undoubtedly be able to convince
themselves that they were motivated to buy or sell by the rumor which
had been invidiously circulated by the company, while in reality the
announcement will have had little to do with the transaction.
The Reynolds case illustrates the need for judicial restraint when
assessing the damages of a few plaintiffs against a public issue corpora-
tion. If several parties are allowed to recover against the company,
class actions representing thousands of investors would undoubtedly
be initiated giving rise to a potentially enormous judgment. Since
private actions such as Reynolds are essentially suits between innocent
parties-the misled investor and the shareholders-care must be taken
to protect the interests of both to the greatest extent possible.
D. An Alternative to Unlimited Liability
When considering the degree to which liability should be extended
in private 10b-5 actions, it is important to distinguish between these
106 Net stockholder equity as of Dec. 31, 1964, was $137,881,361. MooDY's
INDSTrn.AL MAmUAL 2217 (1970).
107 Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F.Supp. 548, 561 (D.Utah 1970).
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cases and tort actions in which the corporation is sued vicariously.
A corporation can foresee liability for the torts of its employees and
it can purchase insurance to cover these situations. By purchasing
insurance it thereby distributes the loss to the general public. 08 On
the other hand, it is impossible for a corporation to treat liability
imposed by 10b-5 as a mere cost of doing busines. For one thing,
the situations are often unique and therefore difficult to foresee.
In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case for instance, Judge Bonsal aptly
characterized the nature of the circumstances which led to the viola-
tion as "once in a lifetime."109 Furthermore, even if the damages could
be foreseen no insurance company would assume a risk for which
there was no ceiling as to damages. For these reasons private actions
under the Rule present a unique problem and the judiciary is in
the unenviable position of having to decide in some cases which of
two innocent parties will bear the loss for misstatements or omissions
by a corporation.
In order to limit the liability in the private action, it is the position
of this Note that scienter should be required. By limiting damages in
this way, the corporations would still be deterred from intentional
violation of the Rule and the injured investor would be compensated
for his loss. On the other hand, the assets of the corporation would
be safe from mere negligent violations of the Rule which would protect
the innocent shareholder from diminution of his investment. Thus, by
requiring scienter, the courts could protect the interests of both the
investor and the shareholder. In situations such as Reynolds, where
deciding whether the defendant possessed the requisite scienter is
difficult, the court should consider the potential liability of the
corporation if it finds scienter.
In addition to requiring scienter in private 10b-5 actions, an
alternative remedy of restitution should be utilized in cases where
benefits have inured to the corporation or insiders through an un-
intentional violation of the Rule. Restitution is designed to avert
unjust enrichment and is uniquely applicable to these cases because
proof of scienter is unnecessary.110 Since the measure of damages is
the defendant's gain, this remedy can be used to retrieve wrongful
gains stemming from unintentional violations without jeopardizing
the general assets of the corporation. Where restitution is used to
recover wrongful benefits received by the corporation or insiders,
recovery should be distributed equally to all injured investors rather
108 Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444, 456-60 (1923).
109 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
110 REsTATEmENT OF RESnON §28 (1935).
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than to only those who had specific dealings with the wrongdoer. This
would eliminate the difficult problem of tracing and prevent the situa-
tion where some investors would receive full recovery while others
would receive nothing due to purely fortuitious circumstances.
In situations where the corporation has corrected misleading in-
formation, liability should not be extended past the date which the
corrected information could reasonably be disseminated to the public.
If an investor claims justifiable reliance on public statements in his
securities trading then it is not unreasonable to expect him to be
informed of the latest information. By not extending liability beyond
this point, the corporation would be encouraged to correct public
misrepresentations since such corrections would terminate further
liability. Furthermore, courts would be spared the impossible task
of determining whether the plaintiff relied on the misleading state-
ment before hearing of the correction.
Some might argue that if plaintiffs are limited to damages caused
by intentional violations of the Rule or to a recovery of benefits
inuring to the corporation or insiders the law would then unduly limit
the recovery of the misled investor. However, one of the primary pur-
poses of the law is to strike a balance between competing interests in
order to maximize justice in each given situation. If the injured investor
is allowed full recovery under all circumstances, then his interest would
prevail in every instance and the interest of the shareholder would
always be disregarded. Thus the affect of full recovery by the investor
in all situations could create as much inequity as before the Rule
was promulgated. Hopefully as the courts become deeper embroiled
in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation this will become more apparent.
Whether these proposals are ever incorporated into 10b-5 juris-
prudence is a matter of pure conjecture at present. The issue of
scienter in regard to the private action is in such a muddled state that
it will probably take a decision by the Supreme Court to clear it up.
The remedy of restitution has not yet been utilized in 10b-5 cases;
since most decisions have gone the plaintiffs way, the establishment
of an alternative theory of recovery has been unnecessary. However,
if recovery is limited to violations of 10b-5 involving scienter, then
restitution could become highly significant.
IV. CopoRATE RiGHr ov AcToN
Since the corporation was the last party to receive the right to sue
under Rule 10b-5, the courts have not yet fully developed the ap-
plicable principles in this form of action. The judiciary has seldom
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discussed the role of scienter in the corporate cases so its ultimate
impact on 10b-5 jurisprudence remains nebulous. Nevertheless, this
section will examine the circumstances in which a corporate action
may arise and attempt to determine the role which scienter seems to
play.
It becomes apparent upon reviewing the corporate cases that
often the nature of these actions is essentially the same as the private
action, differing only in that a corporation, rather than an individual,
is the plaintiff. This results from the simple fact that corporations can
undertake the same investment programs as individuals and there-
fore are as likely to be injured by 10b-5 violations as private parties.
Undoubtedly if a list were made of all the investors who relied on the
misleading press release of Texas Gulf Sulphur, a number of corpora-
tions would be included. In these situations where the complexion of
the corporate action is substantially identical with the private action
the same problems arise. Where the defendant is a public issue
corporation there is a danger of diluting the innocent shareholder's
equity regardless of whether the plaintiff is a corporation or a private
investor. Therefore it is the position of this Note that the corporate
plaintiff should be limited to damages involving scienter in the same
manner as the private party. Moreover, an alternative remedy of
restitution should be established to recover benefits inuring to the
defendants.
An example of the similarity between many corporate actions
and private actions is the comparison between Hooper v. Mountain
States Securities Corporation,11 which was the first case to extend
10b-5 protection to corporations, and Errion v. Connell,".2 which was
a private action. In Hooper, a trustee in bankruptcy brought an action
for the corporation against certain outside interests who had fraud-
ulently induced the company to exchange its shares for allegedly
worthless consideration. The court held that the broad purpose
behind the Rule indicated an intent to include "a person who parts
with stock owned by him as the result of fraudulent practices wrought
on him by his purchaser."" 3 Moreover, within the meaning of the
Rule a "person" included a corporation and its issuance of shares
was a "sale."1 4 In Errion, an eighty-year-old widow was persuaded to
trade stock and real estate worth $124,000 for 125 acres of Oregon
tidelands. The defendants had fraudulently represented the values of
11 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
112 286 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
113 Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir.
1960).
114 Id. at 20D-03,
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the tidelands at $150,000 when in actuality it was only worth $12,500.1"
The Ninth Circuit held that Section 10b gave it jurisdiction over the
whole transaction even though some of the property which the
plaintiff transferred consisted of nonsecurities.1 6 Once this juris-
dictional issue was decided the court had no hesitancy in affirming
a substantial judgment against the defendants for a violation of 10b-5.
Thus in both cases the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to trade
his valuable securities for inadequate consideration and was allowed
to recover under the Rule.
There is one instance, however, where the corporate action is
substantially different from the private action. This is the situation
where a shareholder has brought a derivative suit against the con-
trolling interests of the corporation. Needless to say most of the
reported corporate plaintiff cases are of this nature. Due to the
uniqueness of the 10b-5 derivative suit, the remainder of this section
on the corporate action will be devoted solely to this form of action.
In these derivative suits there is seldom concern about harming
the innocent shareholders of a corporate defendant. There is, how-
ever, another consideration which must be taken into account when
dealing with these cases. Since these actions are usually initiated by
minority shareholders, some of the cases have involved, essentially,
disagreements over the business affairs of the company. Since in 1934
Congress rejected a federal licensing provision for corporations which
would have regulated all intracorporate activity,11 an extension of
federal law into day to day corporate affairs would seem to contravene
congressional intent. Therefore the courts have been careful to exclude
complaints of negligent mismanagement, corporate waste and breach
of fiduciary duty from 10b-5 protection.
When the results of the derivative suits are examined it becomes
apparent that liability is not forthcoming unless scienter is proved.
This stems from the fact that 10b-5 does not cover the daily manage-
ment of the corporation. In order to sustain an action under the
Rule, the corporation must usually prove a fraudulent or deceptive
scheme by insiders to take advantage of their positions to benefit
themselves. As soon as the allegations drift outside the area of
fraud, the suit invariably becomes a case of negligence and corporate
waste relating to the business decisions of the company and hence
falls outside 10b-5 protection.
115 Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 451 (9th Cir. 1956).
116 Id. at 455.
117 Note, Rule 1Ob-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive
Whom? 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 477, 483 (1968).
[Vol. 59
NoTFs
Illustrative of the judiciary's refusal to bring disputes over corporate
business decisions within the Rule's dominion are Lester v. Preco
Industries,i8 and Carliner v. Fair Lanes."9 In Lester, the plaintiff
complained of numerous incidences of corporate mismanagement
which occurred after the corporation had allegedly issued false state-
ments to spur the sale of its stock. The court dismissed the claim
finding that the essence of the allegations was negligent mismanage-
ment. The judge explained that these incidents did not fall within
the bounds of 10b-5 by saying:
Every one of these allegations is a typical, common law charge
of breach of fiduciary duty in the management of a corporation,
and is not normally 'overed by the securities laws. The sale of the
securities is only incidental to a major mismanagement issue. Each
item complained of occurred after the filing of the registration
statement and the issuance of the prospectus and the sale of the
stock.120
In Carliner, a sharehelder of Fair Lanes brought an action against
the controlling interests of the corporation. The complaint alleged
that the defendants had violated 10b-5 by agreeing to repurchase
stock owned by one of the insiders at its market value. It was alleged
that the repurchase was not in the best interests of the corporation
even though the price was admittedly fair and the transaction was
not deceitful. The court dismissed the complaint and indicated that
such transactions were outside the Rule using the following language:
Despite the general principle that Courts will not ordinarily
inquire into questions of business judgment by corporate directors,
this Court would hold, if the question were before it, that the com-
plaint in this case alleges a sufficient breach of the fiduciary duty
owed by the directors of the corporation under State law to re-
quire defendants to answer to a complaint based upon State law.
But no jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship is claimed
or exists in the instant case. To sustain jurisdiction under section
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 plaintiff must allege
facts amounting to deception .... 121
Needless to say, it is not always easy to distinguish between fraud-
ulent or deceptive schemes and other forms of mismanagement. In
order to examine the relevant factors involved in making this determin-
ation three contrasting cases in the Second Circuit will be discussed.
118 282 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
119 224 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
120 Lester v. Preco Industries, 282 F. Supp. 459 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
3
21 Carliner v. Fair Lanes, 244 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Md. 1965).
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In Ruckle v. Roto American Corporation,122 it was alleged that a
majority of the board of directors withheld financial statements from
others at the meetings to enable them to buy treasury stock of the
corporation at an arbitrarily set low price to ensure their control of
the company. Despite the fact that the minority interests on the
board could not have prevented the transaction if the facts had been
disclosed, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action for injunctive relief under the Rule and characterized the
nondisclosure as "fraud" upon the corporation.
123
Within weeks the same court was faced with O'Neill v. Maytag
124
where a stockholder in National Airlines complained of an exchange
of stock between National and Pan American Airways, in which the
value of the Pan Am shares given up by National was in excess of
the value of the National shares received. It was alleged that the
unfavorable ratio represented a premium paid by the defendant
board of directors to eliminate the threat those shares posed to their
control of National. The exchange had been ordered by the Civil
Aeronautics Board due to its findings that cross-ownership of domestic
airlines was not in the public interest.125 The court held that a breach
of "general fiduciary duties where the breach does not involve de-
ception" did not fall within the bounds of Rule 10b-5. 26 The court,
therefore, implied that the whole board could not deceive the
corporation.
In order to reconcile these two cases it is necessary to examine
what the court perceived to be the underlying nature of the action.
In Ruckle it was alleged that there was a scheme by insiders to pur-
chase securities at an arbitrarily set low price to maintain control of
the company. Under the circumstances the court had no trouble
characterizing the plan as fraudulent and therefore within the bounds
of 10b-5. On the other hand, in O'Neill the court felt that while the
premium paid by National may have amounted to a breach of the
defendant's "general fiduciary duty," it did not constitute "deception"
and therefore was outside the protection of the Rule. Although not
emphasized, perhaps a significant reason for the court's decision was
the fact that the stock exchange was motivated by the order of the
Civil Aeronautics Board. The controversy stemmed from a disagree-
ment over the way in which this exchange was carried out. For the
court to have adjudicated this matter it would have had to inquire
122339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
123 Id. at 97.
124339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
125 Id. at 766.
126 Id. at 767.
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into the business considerations which the defendant board of directors
weighed in reaching its decision. This the court was not willing to do.
Several years after Ruckle and O'Neill, the Second Circuit was
called on to decide the complex case of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.
12
7
In that case Acquitaine Company acquired control of Banff Oil Ltd.
and placed three nominees on Banffs eight member board of di-
rectors. 128 Shortly thereafter, Acquitaine and Banff entered into a
partnership agreement under which Banff would explore for oil in
Canada sharing the costs and ownership rights with Acquitaine.
29
On December 11, 1964, the Banff board of directors voted to offer
500,000 shares of Banff treasury stock to Acquitaine at the then market
price of $1.35 per share, supposedly to finance Banif's share of the
exploration expenses. 30 It was alleged however that Banff only needed
$77,500 for this purpose. 31 The purchase was approved by Acquitaine
on January 5, 1965, announced to the public on January 26, 1965, and
actually consummated by delivery of the stock on March 16, 1965.132
The discovery of oil, however, had previously been made on February
6, 1965.'13 In November, 1965, Paribas Corporation, an investment
banking corporation, negotiated a purchase of 270,000 shares at $7.30
a share, the then current price on the Toronto Stock Exchange. How-
ever, once the public announcement of the oil discovery was disclosed
in 1966, Banff stock traded at prices as high as $18 a share. 13 4
Subsequently, a Banff shareholder brought a derivative action
against Acquitaine, BanfFs board of directors and Paribas alleging
that they had taken advantage of their controlling position. 35 The
trial court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment hold-
ing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter due to
the foreign nature of the corporations and that a cause of action could
not be maintained where affirmative deception of the decision-making
body had not been alleged. 36 On appeal before a three judge panel,
the jurisdictional finding was reversed, but the court affirmed the
district court's ruling that a cause of action under the Rule was not
stated.8
7
127 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
128 Id. at 217.
129 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1968) (panel).
10oSchoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane).
l1 Id. at 218.
132 Schoenbam v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1968) (panel).
133 Id. at 205.
134 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
'35 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F.Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
I36 Id. at 393, 396.
13 7 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1968) (panel).
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On rehearing en banc, the court reversed as to Acquitaine and
the Banff board of directors and affirmed as to Paribas. 138 Speaking
for the majority, Judge Hays stated that no action existed against
Paribas since the negotiations for the purchase of the stock were at
"arms length" and it was not in a position to influence the judgment
of the Banff directors. 3 9 With regard to Acquitaine and the Banff
directors, however, Judge Hays concluded that a cause of action had
been stated against them under 10b-5. He seemed to rest his opinion
on two grounds. First, that an improper use of "controlling influence"
to effect a stock transfer for "wholly inadequate consideration" con-
stituted a violation of subdivision (3) of the Rule which outlawed
practices operating as a "fraud or deceit."140 Second, if the allegations
were true, Acquitaine and the Banff directors would be "guilty of
deceiving the stockholders of Banff."14' Apparently forgotten was the
implication of O'Neill that a whole board of directors could not deceive
the corporation.
The defendants attempted to justify the sale to Acquitaine by
arguing that the sale was entered into before the results of the oil
exploration were known. Judge Hays countered this argument by
saying it was uncertain whether a binding contract existed before
the discovery was made and therefore "further investigation" was
necessary. 42 Moreover, the argument that the sale was a business
necessity was negated by the fact that only $77,500 was spent for
exploration while the sale amounted to $675,000.143 Therefore, this
case involved much more than a controversy over the business de-
cisions of the company or negligent mismanagement. Rather, at issue
was whether the defendants would be allowed to siphon off profits
from the corporaton they controlled.
By holding that improper exercise of "controlling influence" to
effect an unfair purchase of stock ran afoul of the Rule, Schoenbaum
substantially enlarged the scope of 10b-5 since deception did not
seem to be necessary to constitute a violation. Under this new
"fraud or deceit" theory the emphasis was placed on whether the
controlling interests used their influence to effect an unfair sale of
corporate securities to themselves rather than if the corporation was
mislead through misrepresentations or nondisclosures. The refusal
of the court to distinguish between simple power plays by controlling
a38 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
139 Id. at 219.
140 Id. at 219-20.
141Id. at 220.
142 Id. at 220.
143Id. at 218.
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interests and deceptive schemes by those interests was reasonable
since both activities accomplish the same purpose. In order to achieve
this result oriented approach the court avoided a strict construction
of the Rule's language. This straining of the 10b-5 language reflected
the federal judiciary's lack of confidence in the adequacy of state law
to protect the rights of minority shareholders.
The Schoenbaum case indicates that the scienter requirement of
the derivative suit is not necessarily limited to an intent to defraud
in its narrow common law sense since misrepresentation by the de-
fendant is not required. Instead, the Rule only requires that the
controlling interests intentionally misuse their position to reap wrong-
ful benefits through securities transactions with the corporation. There-
fore, the scienter requirement is satisfied once this wrongful scheme
is proven, regardless of whether the controlling interests used mis-
representation or deception to accomplish their purpose.
The derivative cases which have just been cited illustrate that,
as a practical matter, proof of intentional wrongdoing is necessary
even though the courts have not formally stated that these cases
require scienter. The situations in which scienter is lacking invariably
involve various forms of negligent mismanagement which fall outside
the bounds of 10b-5. By requring proof of an intentional scheme, the
courts have effectively established reasonable boundaries in the 10b-5
derivative suit.
V. CONCLUSION
By allowing three different parties-the SEC, private parties and
the corporation-to bring an action under the Rule, the courts in-
advertently made 10b-5 jurisprudence perplexing. Each party sought
to utilize this remedy for his own purpose and a need therefore arose
to analyze each type of action in light of the interests and goals of
the parties.
The SEC needed a flexible remedy to enable it to protect the
public from violations of the Rule. This flexible remedy would be
greatly curtailed if scienter were required. Moreover, no desirable
social policy would be accomplished by such a requirement. There-
fore the courts were wise in not requiring scienter in these cases.
The private party sought redress for the injuries he sustained as
the result of the defendant's violation of the Rule. Frequently the
plaintiff's loss corresponded exactly with the defendant's gain and full
recovery could be granted without fear of injury to innocent parties.
In some cases involving public issue corporations, however, the
plaintiff's loss far exceeded the gain received by the corporation or
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insiders. To grant full relief in these cases would work a great
detriment to the innocent shareholder since his equity in the corpora-
tion would be diluted. The private actions which discuss the role of
scienter are conflicting and the role which it will ultimately play is
uncertain. It is the position of this Note that scienter should be
required in these cases and an alternative remedy of restitution
should be established in order to effect a reasonable compromise be-
tween the injured investor and the shareholder.
The corporation sought recovery for injuries it had sustained by
the defendant's violation of the Rule. In some cases, the nature of
the corporate action was similar to the private action and the same
problem of unlimited liability presented. Therefore, it was the
position of this Note that in these cases the corporate plaintiff should
also be required to prove scienter or proceed under the alternative
theory of restitution. There was, however, one instance where the
corporate action was completely different from the rest of 10b-5
jurisprudence. This was the 10b-5 derivative suit. When a scheme
was shown to exist by the controlling interests to wrongfully extract
benefits from the company through stock transfers, the derivative
suit was generally allowed. The opposite result was reached in
negligent mismanagement cases since these cases fell outside the
bounds of Rule 10b-5. Thus in effect, courts interpreted a scienter
requirement into the derivative action.
Hopefully, the courts in the future will focus on the differences of
each type of action so that clear, sound law can be developed.
1. Kent Dunlap
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